Masthead and Recent Cases by unknown
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 20 
Issue 4 November 1955 Article 2 
1955 
Masthead and Recent Cases 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Masthead and Recent Cases, 20 MO. L. REV. (1955) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol20/iss4/2 
This Masthead is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Published in January, April, June, and November by the
School of Law, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.
Volume XX November, 1955 Number 4
If a subscriber wishes his subscription to the Review discontinued at its expiration,
notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise it is assumed that a continuation is
desired.
Subscription Price $2.50 per volume $1.00 per current number
EDITORIAL BOARD





ELVnT S. DOUGLAS, JR.
CHARLES P. DRIBBEN
















ESTHER MAsoN, Business Manager
Publication of signed contributions does not signify adoption of the views ex-
pressed by the REVIEW or its Editors collectively.
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some pro-
found interstitial change in the very tissue of the law."--OLIvE WENaELL HoLDs,
COLLEcrED LEGAL PAPEns (1920) 269.
Recent Cases
PROCEDURE-ABANDONMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
Smith v. St. Louis Public Service Co.1
The plaintiff was injured as a result of a collision between a car driven by
himself and defendant's streetcar. In plaintiff's petition, several assignments of
primary negligence were pleaded. Also, a violation of the humanitarian rule was
1. 259 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1953).
(423)
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pleaded. After all the evidence was in, plaintiff abandoned his assignments of
primary negligence. Thus, at the request of plaintiff, the court gave instructions to
the jury only under the humanitarian doctrine. This move deprived defendant of
the defense of contributory negligence.
The plaintiff recovered a judgment in the trial court for $1500 against defendant
for his personal injuries. The defendant appealed to the St. Louis Court bf Appeals.
The court ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the humanitarian
theory. Both plaintiff and defandant agreed, later upon argument to the supreme
court, that plaintiff failed to make a jury case on the record under this theory. The
court then ordered judgment reversed and the cause remanded for new trial. In so
remanding the case, the court stated that it is a settled practice of appellate procedure
that a judgment should not be reversed for failure of proof without remanding, unless
the record indicates that all of the facts were fully developed and that no recovery
could be had in any event.2 It further stated: "We are not prepared to say that no
recovery could be had in any event."
The cause was transferred to the supreme court, en bane, upon application of
defendant. This court ruled that the case should not have been remanded, but
reversed outright. It stated that no hard and fast rule may be written but that each
case will be determined upon its own facts. It went further to say that where counsel
has committed his client's cause by refusing to restrict the submittance to one issue
because such appears to his strategic advantage in the trial of the case, the cause
should not be remanded for new trial
There seem to be two ideas that arise side by side in determining the question
whether the cause should be reversed outright or remanded5 for new trial. One is
that an appellate court should not reverse a case without remanding unless it is
convinced that the facts are such that a recovery cannot be had.4 Thus, the court
will give the plaintiff a second chance at recovering lawful compensation from
defendant in the event of misadventure.6 But the new trial will not be awarded
2. Lance v. Van Winkle, 358 Mo. 143, 213 S.W.2d 401 (1948); Byrne v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 88 S.W. 2d 344 (Mo. 1935).
3. Buchanan v. Cabiness, 240 M. App. 829, 221 S.W.2d 849 (1949). A court of
appeals has discretion to remand a case for retrial where it seems that ends of justice
would be subserved by so doing.
4. Smith v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 160 S.W2d 476 (Mo. 1942).
Even though the plaintiff fails to substantiate the theory upon which his case was
tried, if he nevertheless shows a state of facts which might entitle him to recover if
his case were brought upon a proper theory, the judgment will not be reversed out-
right, but instead, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, the case will be
remanded to give him the opportunity to amend his petition, if so advised, so as to
state a case upon the theory which his evidence discloses.
5. Hunt v. Chicago M., St. P., P. R.R., 225 S. W.2d 738 (Mo. 1949); Patzman v.
Howey, 340 Mo. 11, 100 S.W.2d 851 (1936); Anderson v. Wells, 220 Mo. App. 19, 273
S.W. 233 (1925); Scott v. Davis, 216 Mo. App. 530, 270 S.W. 433 (1925); Neeper v.
Heinbach, 249 S. W. 440 (Mo. App. 1923); Chandler v. Chicago & A. R.R., 251 Mo. 592,
158 S.W. 35 (1913); Woodson v. Metropolitan R.R., 224 Mo. 685, 123 S.W. 820 (1909);
Rutledge v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 123 Mo. 121, 24 S.W. 1053, 27 S.W. 327 (1894).
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unless it is evident that the party will derive benefit thereby.6 And no new trial
will be granted merely to permit a party to introduce evidence that he might have
introduced on the trial.7 If the evidence would justify a court in submitting that
issue had it not been abandoned, it is but just for plaintiff to give him an opportunity
to be heard on the real merits of his case.
8
The other idea is that on appeal a party directs its complaint only to the assign-
ments still in the case. Whether the abondaned assignments were supported by sub-
stantial evidence or not becomes a moot question. The party has waived his rights
under them.9 Thus, the appellate court should not be required to search the whole
record to find out whether the motion for new trial was property overruled because
there was evidence sustaining some assignments afterwards discarded. There are
several divisional opinions that do not follow this idea.1 0 However, it is well under-
stood that en banc, not divisional, opinions are the controlling authority."
These two ideas are not in conflict. The first is applicable in the case of a legal
misadventure. The second is applicable in the case of counsel trying to secure a
strategic advantage. It might be argued that differentiating between these two
instances is difficult. Could it be said that every case of abandonment of assignments
is for the purpose of securing some legal advantage? Why else would an attorney
seek to confine the assignments? These questions may be answered only by a case
by case approach as the instant en banc case suggests. No hard and fast rule may be
stated. However, in Hunt v. Chicago M, St. P. R.R.12 a formula which is helpful in
determining which of the tvo situations a case falls into is stated as follows:
"Where a party has the benefit of presenting his evidence on all his pleaded
assignments to the jury, and of thereby impressing their minds with the magnitude of
his adversary's dereliction; and then deliberately chooses to restrict the submission to
one issue because he believes that is to his advantage-such a course is more a matter
of legal strategy than of misadventure."
In nearly every negligence case there are fewer assignments submitted to the
jury than there are in the petition. If in every such case plaintiff were entitled to a
new trial, there would be no end to litigation.
IKE SKELTON, JR.
6. Ferguson v. Turner, 7 Mo. 497 (1842).
7. Hospes v. Ahnstedt, 83 Mo. 473 (1884).
8. Gordon v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 153 Mo. App. 555, 134 S.W. 26 (1911).
9. Bean v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 233 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. App. 1950); Bowers
v. Columbia Terminal Co., 213 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. App. 1948); Schiermeier v. Kroger
Grocery Co., 167 S.W.2d 967 (Mo. App. 1943); Gutherie v. City of St. Charles, 347 Mo.
1175, 152 S.W.2d 91 (1941).
10. Yoakum v. Lusk, 223 S.W. 53 (Mo. 1920); Ridge v. Jones, 335 Mo. 219, 71
S.W.2d 713 (1934).
11. Appellate court eases announcing a different opinion than the supreme court,
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